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I. A Conceptual Overview of the Economic Perspective on Law
Prior to 1960, most North American law schools paid attention only to
anti-trust, public utility regulation, and perhaps tax policy from a law and
economics perspective (sometimes referred to as the "old" law and
economics). However, beginning in the early 1960's with pioneering
articles by Guido Calabresil on tort law and Ronald Coase2 (the 1991
recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics) on property rights, followed
by prolific writings and a comprehensive text by Richard Posner' on a
vast range of legal issues, the field of law and economics has burgeoned
* Director, Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. This
paper draws on and extends my essay, "Economic Analysis of Law", in Richard Devlin, ed.,
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1992).
1. Guido Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts," (1961), 70
Yale L. J. 499.
2. Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Costs," (1960), 3 J. L. & Econ. 1.
3. Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4d ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1992).
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with many lawyers and economists around the world now exploring the
economic implications of almost every aspect of the legal system. The
"new" law and economics is often as much interested in non-market as
market behaviour to which the "old" law and economics largely confined
itself. This development has been accompanied by the initiation of a
number of specialized law and economics oriented scholarly journals,
and the appointment or cross-appointment of professional economists to
the faculties of many North American law schools. The law schools at the
University of Chicago, Harvard, Yale, Virginia, Stanford, George Ma-
son, Northwestern, and Berkeley have particularly strong concentrations
of scholars in various aspects of law and economics. In Canada, the Law
and Economics Programme at the University of Toronto Law School was
founded in 1976. Currently six scholars in the Law School have major
interests in law and economics, and four economists are cross-appointed
to the Faculty.
Within their own discipline, economists have recently revived an
institutional tradition with the emergence of fields such as Public Choice
Theory4 (which models collective decision-making e.g. politics, in a
rational, self-interested actor framework) and Transaction Cost Econom-
ics (which attempts to explain alternative contractual and organizational
structures in terms of the relative costs of economic coordination associ-
ated with each).' The emergence of economic analysis of law has not only
attracted many followers, but has also provoked intense controversy, and
in this latter respect can claim some credit for helping to reinvigorate
competing perspectives on law. 6
I will review the distinctive characteristics of the major forms of law
and economics scholarship, both positive and normative, suggesting the
kinds of insights that each form can contribute to legal scholarship. I then
briefly review some of the vast range of issues in other areas of law that
have been addressed in law and economics scholarship.
(1) Styles of Economic Analysis
The central preoccupation of economics is the question of choice under
conditions of scarcity. Given scarcity, economics assumes that individu-
4. See e.g. Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge: University Press, 1989); Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey, Law and Public Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991).
5. Seee.g. OliverWilliamson, MarketsandHierarchies(N.Y.: FreePress, 1975); Williamson,
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (N.Y.: Free Press, 1985).
6. See generally on the history of law and economics scholarship, Cento Veljanovski, The
New Law and Economics (London: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 1982) Edmund Kitch,
"The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics" (1982), 33 J. Leg. Educ., 184.
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als and communities will (or should) attempt to maximize their desired
ends (which may be of infinite variety) by doing the best they can with the
limited resources (means) at their disposal. To the extent that means (or
resources) can be made relatively less scarce, or stretched further, more
ends or goals of individuals or communities can be realized. Obviously,
the legal system, in important ways, structures the choices available to
individuals and groups in a whole range of settings. In analyzing issues
of choice under conditions of scarcity and subject to other constraints,
including constraints imposed by the legal system, law and economics
scholarship employs two conceptually different kinds of analysis.7 The
first style of analysis is conventionally referred to as positive analysis,
meaning descriptive or predictive analysis. The second style of analysis
is normative analysis, meaning prescriptive or judgmental analysis. The
first kind of analysis tends to be much less controversial than the second.
(a) Positive Analysis
With respect to positive economic analysis of legal issues, the analyst
tends to ask the following kind of question: if this (legal) policy is
adopted, what predictions can we make as to the likely economic impacts,
allocative (the pattern of economic activities) and distributive (winners
and losers), of the policy, given the ways in which people are likely to
respond to the particular incentives or disincentives created by the
policy? In predicting these behavioural responses, the positive analyst
will assume that most individuals are motivated by rational self-interest,
in the sense of maximizing their individual utilities subject to whatever
constraints are imposed on the choices open to them. Utility functions
may be infinitely varied. Mother Teresa may be motivated out of pure
altruism to buy rice on the best possible terms from rice dealers in order
to feed starving children in the streets of Calcutta. Another person may
be motivated out of a desire to sustain a decadent life style to buy narcotics
for dealing to drug addicts, causing enormous human suffering as a result.
In conventional supply and demand analysis, it is assumed that in most
contexts more goods or services will be supplied at higher than lower
prices, and that fewer goods or services will be demanded at higher prices
than lower prices - supply curves slope up to the right, demand curves
slope down to the right. Even the supply of altruism is likely to be
inversely related to its cost - more blood is likely to be supplied
altruistically than steak and potatoes. Thus, positive economic analysis is
individualistic and subjective in its behavioural premises. For example,
7. See Posner, op. cit. (1992) chap. 1 & 2; VelIjanovski, ibid., chap. 3.
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a positive analyst of legal issues back in the 1920's might have asked what
behavioural responses on both the supply and demand sides would one
predict by way of reaction to Prohibition laws? Similar questions might
be asked today about various features of the war on drugs. Or the analyst
might ask, what kind of first and second-order behavioural responses
might one predict to rent control laws, or agricultural marketing board
regimes that impose price floors and production quotas on producers, or
minimum wage laws, or cost plus regulation of public utilities, or
exclusive dealing contracts, or the adoption of strict products liability
over negligence, etc. etc. Understanding the incentives effects of these
various legal regimes is a necessary prelude to formulating normative
judgments as to the merits of the regime under analysis relative to
alternative policies that might be employed to pursue the same or
alternative social goals.
The fundamental presumption of neo-classical economics is that
economic agents, in all their various activities, respond to incentives.
This proposition is central to understanding the functioning of any pricing
system, whether it involves explicit (grocery store) prices, or implicit
(penalties for different crimes) prices. To the neo-classical economist, the
legal system is simply an institutional arrangement for prescribing, and
setting implicit prices for, certain activities, within some over-arching
consequentialist objective. It then follows that a crucial aspect of the law
and economics scholar's enterprise is the empirical testing of the pre-
sumption that agents do indeed respond to the implicit prices specified by
the legal system, whether it be in contracts, tort, criminal law, etc. In the
opinion of many law and economics scholars, while law and economics
is powerful in its own right as an organizing and sorting tool, it will
ultimately be judged on the empirical validity of its propositions.
(b) Normative Analysis
With respect to normative economic analysis, again the orientation, as
with positive analysis, is individualistic and subjective. This style of
analysis - conventionally referred to as welfare economics - would tend
to ask the question: Is it likely that this particular transaction or this
particular proposed policy or legal change will make individuals affected
by it better off in terms of how they perceive their own welfare (not as
some external party might judge that individual's welfare). In this
context, two concepts of efficiency are of central importance: Pareto
efficiency (named after an Italian economist writing late in the last
century) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (named after two British econo-
mists writing in the inter-war years of this century). Pareto efficiency
would ask of any transaction or policy or legal change: will this transac-
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tion or change make somebody better off while making no one worse off?.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, on the other hand, would ask the question:
would this collective decision (e.g. a change in legal rules) generate
sufficient gains to the beneficiaries of the change that they could,
hypothetically, compensate the losers from the change so as to render the
latter fully indifferent to it but still have gains left over for themselves.
This latter approach is effectively a form of cost-benefit analysis. Let me
elaborate a little on these two concepts of efficiency.
Neo-classical economists in general attach strong normative value to
regimes of private exchange and private ordering and often bring some
degree of scepticism to bear on the capacity of collective decision makers
e.g. legislatures, regulators, bureaucrats or courts, to adopt policies or
laws that will unambiguously increase net social welfare. This predilec-
tion for private ordering over collective decision-making is based on a
simple (perhaps simple-minded) premise: if two parties are to be ob-
served entering into a voluntary private exchange, the presumption must
be that both feel that the exchange is likely to make them better off,
otherwise they would not have entered into it. Thus, with respect to most
exchanges, the economic presumption is that they make all the parties
thereto better off. This presumption is rebuttable by reference to a fairly
conventional list of forms of market failure, or in a transaction-specific
context, contracting failure, which neo-classical economists recognize as
inconsistent with this presumption e.g. monopoly, externalities, informa-
tion failures. 8
With respect to collective decisions which are not the result of
voluntary agreement among all affected parties, typically such decisions
will generate both winners and losers. The question then becomes
whether the net effect of these decisions is to increase social welfare as
judged by all affected individuals in terms of the impact of such decisions
on their levels of present or prospective utility. The central difficulty here
is that these impacts on individuals' utility functions are not directly
observable by collective decision-makers and there is no ready way of
ensuring accurate revelation by individuals of their evaluation of these
impacts, thus rendering the utilities and disutilities associated with such
a decision largely incommensurable. For example, suppose that it were
proposed that a major new multi-lane highway be constructed through an
urban area, generating gains in utility for commuters from more distant
areas but losses in utility to residents immediately adjacent to the
8. For an excellent exposition and critique of the normative justifications for Pareto effi-
ciency, see Jules Coleman, Markets, Morals, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988) 97-129.
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throughway. How can decision makers be confident that the net effect on
social welfare of a decision to proceedwith construction ofthethroughway
will be positive? Similar questions arise with respect to changes in legal
regimes which are imposed on affected parties by collective decision and
which make some individuals better off and others worse off. How does
one go about determining whether the gains in utility to one group exceed
the losses in utility to the other? Thus, economists feel much more
confident about making welfare judgments about the impact of private
exchanges on the parties thereto than the impact of collective decisions
on all parties affected by them.
(2) Limitations of the Economic Perspective9
I have sketched a highly simplified explanation for why many economists
prefer notions of Pareto efficiency to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, at least in
contexts where private exchange and private ordering is feasible. One
objection to the concept of Pareto efficiency, even in its own terms, is that
concepts of voluntariness, complete information, and (absence of) exter-
nalities upon which it is predicated are extraordinarily vague and to an
important extent indeterminate. A conventional external ethical critique
of the concept of Pareto efficiency is that it takes existing preferences, of
whatever kind, as given and provides no ethical criteria for disqualifying
morally monstrous or self-destructive preferences as unworthy of recog-
nition. This is a standard objection to any form of utilitarianism. Further-
more, it is also argued that Pareto efficiency is wholly insensitive to the
justice or injustice of the prior distribution of endowments that parties
bring to an exchange, but rather takes these endowments as given in
evaluating the welfare implications of a given exchange. The claim as to
the centrality of individual autonomy as a central social value has been
strongly contested by many scholars who see the autonomous individual
self of classical liberal theory as reflecting an impoverished pre-social
conception of human life."° Rather, it is constitutive attachments to
particular families, communities, groups, and institutions which make
human life rich and formative of true human identities. Moreover, it is
claimed that many preferences are socially constructed, and their exis-
tence and validity should not be viewed as prior or exogenous to the
9. See e.g., Mark Kelman,A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987).
10. See e.g. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1973); especially "Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom," at 143-156;
Thomas Nagel, "Libertarianism Without Foundations" (1975), 85 Yale L.J. 136. (review of
Nozick); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
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choices of social, economic, and legal systems which help shape them.
This kind of communitarian perspective would contend for a much more
affirmative conception of individual autonomy or freedom that does not
merely imply freedom from restraints, but the availability of adequate
opportunities and resources to all individuals to enable them to achieve
full human flourishing as social beings. Some of these objections are also
directed against the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency: it accepts all
existing preferences (at least those supported by dollars) as equally valid;
and to the extent that cost-benefit analysis reflects only willingness-to-
pay measures of value (rather than underlying utility functions, whether
able to be supported by dollars or not), disparities in endowments will bias
cost-benefitjudgments in distributively unjust ways. Posner has argued'1
that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (or wealth maximization) is a superior.
ethical norm to utilitarianism because it only validates those preferences
supportable by resources which in most cases have been obtained by
providing goods or services to others that presumably have enhanced the
welfare of the latter. This thesis has proven highly contentious and for
many critics unpersuasive, in part because endowments may reflect the
luck of the genetic lottery or early family circumstances and not any
morally defensible theory of desert.12
I acknowledge that these criticisms of normative economics have
substantial force, but view them as revealing the partial nature of the
claim on total wisdom that economics must confine itself to, as I elaborate
in my concluding comments.
I will now briefly sketch some applications of the economic analysis
of law.
I. Applications of Economic Analysis of Law
(1) The Economic Role of Property Rights13
The definition and specification of property rights is primarily the
function of the law of property and to a lesser extent the law of torts
(nuisance). The protection of property rights is principally the function of
11. See Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981).
12. See "Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern," (1980), 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
13. See generally on the economic role of property rights, Posner op. cit., (1992) chap. 3;
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman &
Co., 1988), chaps. 4 and 5; Robert Ellickson, "Property in Land," (1993), 102 Yale L.J. 1315;
Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, eds., The Economics of Property Rights (Cambridge:
Ballinger, 1974); Michael Trebilcock, "Communal Property Rights: The Papua New Guinea
Experience" (1984), 34 U. of Toronto L.J. 377; Jack Knetsch, Property Rights and Compen-
sation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983).
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both tort law (nuisance, trespass, conversion, detinue) and the criminal
law. Providing for the transferability of property rights is principally the
function of the law of contracts.
In defining and specifying property rights, an economic perspective
would seek definitions and specifications that internalize as fully as
possible to a property rights holder all the costs and benefits associated
with utilization of the property rights in question. Failure to internalize
costs may create negative externalities leading to over-utilization of the
resources in question from a social perspective. For example, a widget
factory that pollutes the surrounding neighbourhood treats clean air as a
free resource even though people in the neighbourhood place a positive
value on it. By not including this social cost in the costs of production of
widgets, the price of widgets does notreflecttheir true social costs and too
many are demanded by consumers, too many are produced, and too much
pollution is created. Failure to internalize benefits may create positive
externalities, leading to under-utilization of the resource in question from
a social perspective. For example, if I plant corn on my farm but other
people are allowed to help themselves to it when it is ripe, there is little
or no incentive for me to utilize the land in this way. Similarly, if I spend
considerable resources inventing a new product but others are able to
copy my idea without making any such investments and without reim-
bursing me, I have little incentive to use my innovative talents in this
fashion. Optimal resource allocation and utilization requires that both
divergences between private costs and social costs be minimized and that
divergences between private benefits and social benefits also be mini-
mized. Hence arguments for exclusivity in the definition of property
rights. Assuming that property rights have been defined and specified in
ways that internalize costs and benefits from utilization of a resource as
fully as possible, the economic perspective on property rights would then
focus on the importance of facilitating the transferability of these prop-
erty rights so as to ensure that they end up in their highest valued social
uses. This is principally the function of the law of contracts and the
exchange process.
Property rights issues are pervasive in both contemporary and tradi-
tional societies. Most environmental problems and other related prob-
lems such as that of endangered species like whales or elephants can be
seen as exemplifying classic common property problems; similarly in the
case of natural resource exploitation such as fisheries and forests. In the
intellectual property sphere, debates over commercial piracy, compul-
sory licensing of patented drugs and otherinnovations, unilateral copying
of texts and articles, reverse engineering, copying of computer software
and hardware etc. all raise property rights issues that exhibit many of the
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same characteristics. With respect to interests in land, in response to
increasing population density in urban and vacation centres, new interests
in land have evolved, such as condominiums, co-operatives, and time-
sharing arrangements where the incentive effects associated with differ-
ent definitions of individual and common areas affect how the resources
are utilized. In many developing countries, problems of land reform are
central to the formulation of effective development strategies. In the
former command economies of Eastern Europe privatizing state-owned
property and enterprises is widely seen as essential to the more efficient
utilization of these assets although the modalities of privatization have
raised many complexities. In the case of real property, should an attempt
be made to rectify past wrongs by returning the property to the past
owners (as of what date?) or their descendants?. In the case of state owned
enterprises, should they simply be auctioned off to the higher bidder
(including foreigners?), or should vouchers for their stock be given away
to the population at large, or should current workers become the principal
stock-holders, or should financial intermediaries (mutual funds) hold
their stock on behalf of citizens? 4 An economic perspective on property
rights is indispensable in uncovering the various incentive or disincentive
effects associated with alternative legal regimes in all of the above
contexts.
(2) The Economic Functions of Contract Law15
As noted above, neo-classical economists have a predilection in favour
of resource allocation through voluntary exchanges as opposed to collec-
tive decisions because they believe that one can have a higher degree
confidence in the welfare implications of private exchanges, where both
parties stand to benefit, than collective decisions where typically there are
both winners and losers and it is difficult to. net out gains against losses.
However, this predilection for the private exchange or market process in
the allocation of resources does not speak to the economic role of contract
law. From an economic perspective, at least four major functions of
contract law can be identified.
14. See Ron Daniels and Robert Howse, "Reforming the Reform Process: A Critique of
Proposals for privatization in Central and Eastern Europe," New York J. of International Law
and Relations (forthcoming).
15. See Anthony Kronman and Richard Posner, The Economics of Contract Law, (Boston:
Little Brown & Co., 1979) chap. 1; Posner op. cit., chap. 4; Cooter and Ulen op. cit., chap. 7;
Michael Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1993). Richard Craswell and Alan Schwartz, eds., Readings in Contract Law (N.Y.:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Robert Scott and Douglas Leslie, eds., Contract Law
and Theory, 2d ed. (Charlottesville: Michie Company, 1993).
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(a) Containing Opportunism in Non-Simultaneous Exchanges
The law of contracts by providing remedies in the event of breach of
contractual promises provides an essential check on opportunism in non-
simultaneous exchanges by ensuring that the first mover, in terms of
performance, does not run the risk of defection, rather than co-operation,
by the second mover.16
(b) Reducing Transaction Costs
A second economic function of the law of contracts is to supply parties
to given categories of exchanges with standard sets of implied terms (that
typically they are free to bargain around if they wish) but which in most
cases are joint welfare maximizing and save the parties the transaction
costs entailed in fully specifying a complete contingent claims contract.
In addition to various aspect of the common law of contracts, many
statutes such as the Sale of Goods Act, the Partnership Act, and perhaps
certain aspects of corporation statutes can be thought of in these terms.
(c) Discouraging Carelessness in the Exchange Process
A third economic objective served by the law of contracts is to discourage
carelessness in the exchange process, causing detrimental reliance. Thus,
in rules relating to breach of express warranties, innocent or negligent
misrepresentation, mistake, promissory estoppel etc., the law attempts to
assign liability for negative outcomes from an exchange to the party who
could have avoided the problem by taking cost-justified precautions.
(d) Identifying Pareto Superior Exchanges
A central economic role of contract law is to formulate a set of excuses
for contract performance that permits the enforcement of efficient ex-
changes, but discourages the enforcement of inefficient exchanges that
do not meet the criterion of Pareto efficiency. It will be recalled that this
criterion requires that at least one party to an exchange perceive himself
or herself as better off and the other party no worse off, but in practice both
parties, at least ex ante, should perceive the exchange as mutually
beneficial. Within aParetian framework, lack of voluntariness, imperfect
information, or externalities are likely to provide the principal founda-
tions for an economically-grounded set of excuses, whatever the legal
form that these may take.
16. See Anthony Kronman, "Contract Law and the State of Nature," (1985), 5 J. of Law. Ecs.
and Org.
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(3) Tort Law17
Much U.S. law and economics scholarship has focused on modelling
alternative liability rules in areas such as products liability and medical
malpractice with a view to identifying that set of rules which is efficient
in the-sense of minimizing the sum of expected accident and accident
avoidance costs. This body of scholarship has largely focused on the
debate between strict liability and negligence and on the kinds of defenses
e.g. contributory negligence, comparative negligence, volenti, that ought
to be recognized under any liability regime. In addition, some attention
has been paid to rules governing the quantum of damages, and in
particular whether there is a case for awarding non-pecuniary damages.
With respect to damage calculations more generally in torts cases,
especially personal injury cases, economists are now quite widely used
as expert witnesses in both the U.S. and Canada in estimating expected
economic losses from an accident, and applying appropriate discount
rates to reduce future economic losses to a present value lump sum. The
liability insurance crisis that hit North America in 1986, characterized by
dramatic increases in premiums, reductions in coverage or increases in
deductibles and exceptions, and in some cases withdrawal of coverage
altogether, precipitated fundamental re-evaluations of what goals the tort
system should properly be asked to serve. In particular, law and econom-
ics scholars have tended to argue that viewing tort law as a risk-spreading
or social insurance mechanism as opposed to a deterrence or corrective
justice mechanism in part explains the destabilization of liability insur-
ance markets, especially in the products liability and medical malpractice
fields. Related debates have focused on the case for substitution of no-
fault compensation schemes for the tort system, especially in the automo-
bile accident context, where attention has often centred on the potential
loss of deterrence incentives for avoiding risky driving behaviour. In
general in North America there has been little support for a general
accident compensation scheme along the New Zealand lines, in part
because of its projected costs and concerns over the scale of likely ex ante
and expost moral hazard incentives for injurers and victims.
17. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1987); William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1987); Posner op. cit., chap. 6; Cooter and Ulen,
op. cit., chaps 8 and 9; Mitchell D. Polnsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 2d ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown Co. 1989); Saul Levmore, ed., Readings in Tort Law (N.Y.: Oxford
University Press, forthcoming); Don Dewees and Michael Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the
Tort System and its Alternatives: A Review of Empirical Evidence" (1992), 30 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 37.
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(4) Corporate Laws
Over the last decade, law and economics scholarship in the corporate law
area has burgeoned and this area is perhaps currently the most active area
in law and economics scholarship. A wide range of issues has attracted
attention. Literature on the theory of the firm has attempted to explain
why we observe some firms contracting-out the supply of inputs, and in
other cases integrating their production within the firm. Transaction cost
economics has also focused on alternative modes of organization of the
firm, by evaluating how alternative modes of legal organization of
productive activities may minimize various kinds of costs, such as
information costs, monitoring costs, chiselling costs, and other forms of
opportunism (often referred to as agency costs). Another body of schol-
arship has focused on the economic case for limited liability, and has
raised some serious questions as to whether, in some circumstances,
limited liability permits firms inefficiently to externalize various kinds of
costs of their activities to third parties. Another debate has surrounded the
regulation of takeovers, and what forms of defensive tactics incumbent
management should be permitted to utilize and whether acquirers should
be required to leave their bids open for some minimum period of time so
that other bidders may have an opportunity to bid for the control of the
target firm. Other issues that have attracted analysis pertain to the nature
of corporate constitutions. One view that has attracted much support
(although contested in various respects) is that corporate charters or
constitutions should be viewed as a nexus of contracts amongst the
various stakeholders in the corporation, the implication being that the role
of corporate law is simply to supply a set of implied terms to the parties,
which they should in most circumstances be free to reject or modify as
they wish, including fiduciary duties and duties of care. With respect to
the regulation of securities markets, much work has been done, both
theoretical and empirical, on the strength of the efficient capital market
hypothesis, and whether much securities market regulation, which is
often predicated on serious information failures, can in fact be justified.
Another emerging set of issues which has begun to attract the interest of
law and economics scholars relates to the privatization of state-owned
enterprises in Eastern Europe; where alternative models of the privatization
process clearly have very different efficiency and distributional
implications.
18. See generally, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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(5) Competition Law
While competition or antitrust law is often viewed as one of the 'old' areas
of law and economic, economic analysis has had a major impact, over the
last two decades, on the evolution of North American competition law. 19
Two areas of competition law, in particular, have been fundamentally
rethought as a result of new economic thinking. First, the highly mecha-
nistic structural rules that focus predominantly on market share or
concentration levels which dominated U.S. merger law through the
1950's and 1960's (reflected in notorious decisions like U.S. v. Von's
Grocery Co.2"), have now largely been rejected in favour of a more
dynamic and less static framework of analysis, that assigns central
significance to factors such as barriers to entry and potential competition,
including competition from foreign suppliers. The other area of compe-
tition law that has been fundamentally rethought involves vertical re-
straints, such as exclusive dealing arrangements, tying agreements, and
resale price maintenance, which previous economic thinking and legal
doctrine viewed, with few exceptions, as anti-competitive. The current
economic thinking, reflected to an increasing extent in changes in legal
doctrine, now views many of these arrangements as presumptively
efficient and benign. Rather than being efforts by up-stream manufactur-
ers to tie-up down-stream markets and abuse market power these contrac-
tual practices can often be thought of as attempts to align the incentives
of down-stream parties with up-stream suppliers in terms of inducing an
efficient level of promotional and service effort by the down-stream
parties.
(6) International Trade Law2
International trade law has attracted increasing attention from law and
economics scholars, with scholarship focusing on the rationales for and
design of trade remedy law regimes, such as anti-dumping laws,
19. See e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law (St. Paul Minn.:
WestPublishing Co., 1985); Frank Mathewson, MichaelTrebilcock and Michael Walker, eds.,
The Law and Economics of Competition Policy (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1990); Bruce
Dunlop, David McQueen and Michael Trebilcock, Canadian Competition Policy: A Legaland
Economic Analysis (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1987); Richard Posner, Antitrust Law:
The Economic Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Robert Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1978).
20. U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
21. See Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock, International Trade: Legal Order and
PoliticalEconomy (London: Roufledge, forthcoming); Thomas Boddez and MichaelTrebilcock,
Unfinished Business: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws in North America (Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute, 1993); Michael Trebilcock, Marsha Chandler and Robert Howse, Trade and
Transitions: A Comparative Analysis of Adjustment Policies (London: Routledge, 1990).
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countervailing duty laws, and safeguards regimes. The bulk of the
scholarship has tended to converge on the view that anti-dumping
regimes have no coherent economic rationale and that countervailing
duty regimes have little more economic justification. A burgeoning
political discourse has developed, particularly in the U.S., over fair trade
rather than free trade, and the alleged virtues of level playing fields under
threat of unilateral sanctions, including retaliatory action under Super
301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Here,
law and economics scholarship has much to contribute in sorting out
specious (and self-serving) from well-founded "unfair" trade claims.
Another issue that has engaged attention relates to the rise of regional
trading blocks and their relationship with the GATT Multilateral System.
To what extent do regional trading blocs involve trade diversion rather
than trade expansion and how best can their relationship with other
regional trading blocs and with the GATT system at large be reconciled?
(7) Criminal Law2
While the criminal law area has attracted less attention from law and
economics scholars than many others, some important work has been
done, especially with respect to the determination of the optimal penalty
for various kinds of crimes, especially white-collar crimes such as price
fixing and securities fraud. Much of the literature has found significant
elements of under-deterrence in the conventional penalty structure through
failure to set the expected penalty, which is a product of the probability
of apprehension and the punishment, at a level which removes any gains
from engaging in the offending conduct. The literature has also modelled
theoretically and tested empirically whether in setting the optimal penalty
it is better to raise the punishment and lower the apprehension rate or vice
versa. Another area relates to the efficacy of criminal sanctions and
alternative accident reduction regimes in the traffic accident context.23
Most of the empirical literature finds here that conventional criminal
sanctions have quite modest deterrence effective, while exposure limit-
ing regimes appear to be much more effective. In a recent study that I and
a colleague undertook for the Alberta Automobile Insurance Board,24 an
analysis of a sample of 577 bodily injury claims files in 1990 revealed that
10 claims out of the total sample (1.7% of the claims) accounted for
22. See Posner, op. cit. chap. 7; Cooter and Ulen op. cit. chap. 11 and 12.
23. See Martin Friedland, Michael Trebilcock and Kent Roach, Regulating Traffic Safety
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
24. Bruce Chapman and Michael J. Trebilcock,A Review of OptionsforReform of theAlberta
Auto Accident Compensation Regime (August 30, 1991).
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almost 40 percent of the total payouts. On closer examination of these ten
claims, it turned out that nine of the ten defendants were males, six were
young males aged 17 to 24, five involved alcohol impairment and seven
of the accidents happened not on city streets but on rural roads or
highways. Exposure limiting strategies would focus on such policy
options as raising the drinking age, raising the driving age, wider use of
short-term licence suspension, graduated licensing regimes where young
drivers are subject to a curfew or subject to constraints as to who may
accompany them in the car, or where even low blood alcohol levels will
nevertheless trigger licence suspension.
(8) Family Law2'-
In family law, various economic theories of marriage have been ad-
vanced, some focusing on the gains from division of labour and special-
ization, others on marriage law as a signalling device as to what kinds of
relationships prospective marriage partners are seeking. In the light of
these theories, assessments have been made of the likely impact of no-
fault divorce reform on propensities to marry and behaviour during the
marital relationship. An important related issue that has recently begun
to engage Canadian courts and policy-makers is the determination of
appropriate support obligations on marriage break-down, particularly in
more traditional marriages where one spouse (typically the wife) is
economically largely dependent on her husband and where as a result of
marriage her ability to re-enter the workforce and earn a decent income
for herself has been seriously impaired. Law and economics scholarship
has attempted to construct implicit insurance contracts that rational
parties might agree to ex ante to compensate for the economic conse-
quences of marriage breakdown in these circumstances and to address the
opportunity costs of marriage for the dependant spouse.
(9) Access to Justice26
A good deal of law and economics scholarship hcs addressed issues such
as: (a) reasons for court delay and the modification of incentive structures
for litigants and their lawyers to reduce these delays; (b) the case for
25. See e.g. Michael Trebilcock and Rosemin Keshvani, "The Role of Private Ordering in
Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective," (1991), 41 U. of Toronto L.J. 533; June
Carbone and Margaret Brinig, "Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change
and Divorce Reform" (1991), 65 Tulane L. Rev. 953; Richard Posner, Sex and Reason
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
26. See Posner op. cit., chap. 21.
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contingent fees as a means of financing litigation; (c) the role of class
actions as a way of achieving economies of scale in litigation; (d) the role
of lawyers' advertising both in alerting citizens to the need for legal
services in various contexts and in terms of competing down fee levels;
(e) the role of para-professionals in enhancing the efficient provision of
legal services and possible forms of firm organization that provide para-
professionals with an ownership stake in law firms; (f) therole ofpre-paid
legal service plans.
(10) Immigration Law
Recent law and economics scholarship has focused on various aspects of
immigration law that determine the total intake of immigrants and the
composition of the intake in terms of whether the restrictions typically
involved have any efficiency justifications for them. Some of this work
has been of a detailed empirical nature, and has tended to refute many of
the myths surrounding immigration i.e. that immigrants displace existing
citizens from jobs or depress their wages.27 Most of this work would
support a more liberal immigration policy not only for philosophical
reasons, but even for more parochial efficiency reasons.
This is but a small sampling of areas in which law and economics
scholars have been active and a sketch of the kinds of. issues and
orientations reflected in their work. Many other areas have also attracted
attention. These include: internal barriers to trade in federal systems;2"
rationales for prohibiting private acts of discrimination;2 9 the rules
governing commercial transactions, such as sales transactions and bank-
ruptcy law;3" intellectual property and the appropriate design of patent,
copyright, and trademark rules;3' and the organization of law firms.32
27. See Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell, 1989); George Boras, Friends or Strangers: The Impact of lmmigrants on the U.S.
Economy (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1990); Economic Council of Canada, Economic and Social
Impacts of Immigration (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991).
28. See Trebilcock et. al., eds., Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (Toronto:
Ontario Economic Council, 1983).
29. See Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract, op. cit., chap. 9.
30. See Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, eds., Commercial Transactions (Westbury N.Y.:
Foundation Press, 1991); Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
31. Posner op. cit. (1992) at 38-45.
32. See e.g. Ronald Daniels, "The Law Firm as Efficient Community" (1992), 33 McGill L.J.
801; Daniels, "Growing Pains: The Why and How of Law Firm Expansion" (1993), 43
University of Toronto L.J. 147; Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, "Sharing Among the
Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into Corporate Law Firms and How Partners Split
Profits" (1985), 37 Stanford L. Rev. 313.
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Ill. Conclusion
Let me conclude by acknowledging that any one-value view of the world
is likely to prove, at the limit, self-defeating. For economists to claim that
they are only interested in maximizing the total value of social resources,
without being concerned about how gains in the value of social resources
are to be distributed and whether these gains are in fact making the lives
of individuals better, and whose lives,33 or while ignoring the impact of
economic change on the lives of individuals or on the integrity or viability
of long-standing communities, reflects a highly impoverished view of the
world.34 On the other hand, theorists committed only to concepts of
distributive justice who proceed in their analysis by inviting us to assume
a given stock of wealth, or a given increase in the stock of wealth, and then
asking what a just distribution of that wealth might entail are largely
engaging in idle chatter as long as the wealth creation function is simply
assumed. Creating wealth is a necessary pre-condition to distributing it.
Similarly, communitarians who stress values of solidarity and
interconnectedness and discount values of individual autonomy and
freedom riskpushing this perspectiveto an extreme where communitarian
values become exclusionary, authoritarian, or repressive. In shaping a
more congenial world, itis hard to imagine how economics could not play
a prominent, albeit non-exclusive, role.
33. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
34. See Trebilcock, Chandler and Howse, op. cit. chap. 1.
